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11. The Issue
Concern about the rate at which the world’s forests are being depleted is wide-
spread. Recent international calls for radical efforts to reduce deforestation include
the United Nations Inter-governmental Forum on Forests of the UN Commission
on Sustainable Development (1999), and the World Commission on Forests and
Sustainable Development (1999). This concern reflects an appreciation of the
ecological and economic functions of forests: as providers of timber and many
non-timber predicts, as the habitat for much of the world’s biological diversity,
and as regulators of local, regional and global environments. These functions are
at risk. Most of the forest clearance is in areas of high forest cover and high
human population pressure in tropical areas for agriculture. In temperate and
boreal areas the pressures from logging are more important. But in all areas,
forestry itself has an important role to play both as a partial cause of deforestation,
and, if practiced wisely, as a potential source of salvation for at least some of the
world’s forests. In terms of its causal role, forestry tends to open up primary forest
areas, enabling colonists to move in, using roads forged by the timber companies.
In some parts of the world, forests are converted not to agriculture but to biomass
plantations of fast growing trees or to other agro-industries based on tree-crop
plantations such as palm oil and rubber.  Here the primary agent is not the peasant,
but the richer elements of local and international society.
How, then, can the world’s forests be used more wisely? It is this admittedly
grand and complex question that we seek to answer in this paper. Some argue for
outright protection, caricatured perhaps in the phrase ‘fence and forget’. Others
argue for ‘sustainable forest management’, and still others for systems of forest
management that rely on acceptance of an initial period of exploitation of valuable
species followed by outright protection. The issue, then, is the optimal use of
forested land1, which begs the question of what is meant by ‘optimal’. This is
addressed shortly.
Forested land may be retained as forest or it may be converted to non-forest uses
such as crop agriculture, livestock, and urban expansion, or to industrial tree
crops. The first question, then, is under what circumstances it is better to convert
forest land to non-forest uses, and when not.
If it can be shown that forest  land is best retained as forest - where ‘best’ needs to
defined (see below) - the further issue arises of what kind of  forestry is to be
preferred.. Here the issue is clouded in terminological confusion because the
                                                
1 We use the term forested land rather than forest land to make it clear that we are dealing with
land that still has forest on it, rather than land which has a potential to be used for forest in one
form or another.
2words used in reference to forestry have come to mean different things to different
people.  But, in order to focus the debate we choose three archetypes familiar in
the literature: conventional logging (CL), sustainable timber management (STM)
and sustainable forest management (SFM). We adopt this terminology not
because we think it is free from misinterpretation, but because the literature on the
role of forestry in deforestation has adopted it, making it extremely difficult to
elicit the lessons from that literature without using that language. We devote some
time to explaining what we mean by the terms below and why, in an ideal world,
we would prefer a different terminology. For the moment, we take CL to be more
short-term in focus, less concerned with forest regeneration through management,
and often lacking in government control. We take STM to be a forest management
system that aims for sustained timber yields. We take SFM to be a system of
forest management that aims for sustained yields of multi-products from the
forest.
There have been recent challenges to the idea that conservation is best served
through sustainable timber or forest management (Bowles et al., 1998; Vincent,
1992; Kishor and Constantino, 1993; Howard et al, 1996; Rice et al, 1997). One
argument is that conservation can only be served by outright protection (Bowles et
al., 1998), i.e. while SFM has the potential for protection, it is inferior to outright
protection. Another view is that conservation might be better served by an initial
period of well managed logging followed by protection (Rice et al., 1998a;  Rice
et al., 1998b; Cannon et al., 1998). Against this, it is argued that outright protect-
ion has an extremely limited chance of being successful in face of the high costs
of protection, the need to use forests for profit, and human  population growth: in
many places sustainable forestry management offers the only chance of
maintaining forests and biodiversity (Whitmore, 1999).
32. The Theme
In terms of the debate about the optimal use of forested lands, the existing
literature tends to focus on the financial returns from STM, SFM and CL and on
physical descriptions of the comparative ecological impact profiles of these forms
of forest use management. The focus on financial returns is justified in so far as
actual forest use is determined by relative profits. The focus on ecological impact
profiles is relevant for a full economic assessment. An economic assessment
makes three potentially major adjustments to a financial analysis: the existing
financial costs and benefits are adjusted to ‘shadow values’ to reflect the true
opportunity cost of the resources involved; and environmental and social costs and
benefits (‘externalities’) are included both at the national level, and at the global
level.
(1) The first modification adjusts financial costs and benefits to reflect shadow
prices. A shadow price, say the price of labour or the exchange rate, differs
from a financial price in that it reflects the true opportunity cost of the
resources in question. As an instance, the ruling wage rate would be used in
a financial analysis, but if the labour employed would otherwise be un-
employed, the shadow wage rate will tend to be closer to zero (since the
wage in alternative employment is, effectively, zero). A shadow exchange
rate is the rate that would prevail if trade was free and open, rather than, as
is often the case,  managed through trade quotas and tariffs. It is important
to understand that this shift to shadow pricing alters the stakeholder
perspective. Whereas financial costs and benefits are relevant to the logger
or concessionaire, shadow priced costs and benefits are relevant from the
standpoint of the forest owning nation.
(2) The second modification adds in all environmental and social consequences
which affect the wellbeing of anyone within the nation. Thus, if indigenous
peoples are adversely affected by the forest development, their wellbeing
must be counted in any economic study. Similarly, if logging gives rise to
soil erosion, loss of flood control, loss of biodiversity, etc., an economic
analysis would attempt to take these into account. It is important to
understand that ecological functions of forests have a parallel in economic
magnitudes – all ecological functions are economic functions.
(3) The third modification  constitutes a global analysis and would additionally
include the gains and losses of people outside the country in which the
forest is located. Thus, if individuals in another country experience a loss of
wellbeing from knowing that deforestation, perhaps indirectly caused
through logging, is taking place, that loss of wellbeing has also to be
accounted for. This loss of wellbeing is relevant regardless of whether it
4emanates from a loss of any use value (e.g. ecotourism, or carbon storage )
or any loss of non-use value, i.e. wellbeing unassociated with any direct use
of the forest.
It is not always appreciated that economic analysis is potentially quite different to
financial analysis. An economic analysis might, for example, sanction an activity
that is wholly unprofitable from a financial standpoint.
In this paper we try to build up the overall picture, as best we can, by beginning
with financial analysis and extending it to full global economic assessment. It is
important to understand that a global economic assessment is useful only in so far
as it demonstrates the superiority of one form of forest land use over another, i.e.
it shows, in an accounting sense, which land use is ‘best’. Unless there are
corresponding cash flows which capture those values, the exercise remains
interesting but unlikely to cause changes in the way  forests are treated. For
example, SFM may turn out to be financially inferior to CL, but this does not
mean that SFM is to be dismissed. An economic analysis that includes all social
and environmental externalities can guide us to the relevant conclusion. Now
suppose the economic analysis demonstrates that SFM is superior to CL, regard-
less of the contrary finding for the financial analysis. Since the financial costs and
benefits ‘drive’ the land use decision, SFM can only be introduced if forest land
use is regulated in some way, or if forest land users are compensated for the
difference between the profits under CL and the profits under SFM. In this paper
we are concerned mainly with the demonstration phase. The broad issue of
designing compensatory and ‘capture’ incentives is not addressed in detail here
except indirectly by reference to the literature, e.g. Pearce (1996), Panayotou and
Ashton (1992).  Capture mechanisms include debt-for-nature swaps, carbon
trading, forest certification etc.
53. The Terminology of Forest Management
As noted above, the terminology used in the debate over the appropriate use of
forested land has become confusing.
‘Logging’ rightly refers to the process of harvesting timber from a forest, but
whereas timber harvesting appears ‘value-neutral’, logging has come to be
regarded as necessarily destructive  and evoking the picture of huge clear-cuts on
steep slopes. Logging, however, can be a legitimate part of good  or ‘wise’ forest
management.  In the same way, the literature now refers to ‘conventional logging’
as if it too characterises undesirable treatment of forest. To a forester, however,
conventional logging might characterise standard forest management practice as
opposed to unconventional means of timber extraction, e.g. with the use of
helicopters. But some conventional logging is not practiced wisely, so that it
becomes possible to contrast poor management practice with, say, reduced impact
logging (RIL). To a forester, RIL would simply be a feature of any good manage-
ment system. In what follows we maintain the more popular image of
conventional logging as meaning use of the forest for short-term timber supplies,
aimed solely at short-term profits and without significant government control.
Management plans may or may not exist for this type of timber harvesting, and,
while the potential is there for switching to a more long-term sustained timber
yield, it is more likely that forest degradation, forest loss and conversion to non-
forest use will follow.
In terms of timber volumes, conventional timber harvesting may be sustainable or
unsustainable. But the connotation of conventional logging is that it is often
unsustainable, i.e. not focused on long term timber supplies. Sustainable timber
management (STM) therefore arises when a forest management plan is fully
implemented for timber is fully implemented and focuses on the long term. Note
that the sustained  yield does not necessarily mean that one species is sustained
over time. As the forest structure and composition change over time because of
harvesting or natural succession, harvested species may change.
Sustainable forest management embraces the view of the forest as yielding many
different products and providing many different ecological services. Sustainable
forest management will therefore produce an array of products and services which
may or may not include timber. SFM  therefore relates to the multiple use of the
forest. To a forester, the term ‘management’ could relate to the management of
resources, inventorying  and yield calculation, and to silvicultural practice (e.g.
climber cutting), so that, on some definitions, SFM is already embodied in good
practice timber harvesting. Again, then, the terminology of SFM is not ideal but is
retained here to convey the idea of multi-product uses and with a focus on the
longer term.
6‘Protection’ is also ambiguous. For ardent environmentalists it almost certainly
means the maintenance of the structure and composition of the forest without
change caused by human intervention. For others it risks being confused with
‘conservation’ which is the proper management of the forest for the sustained
yield of some product(s), service(s), or some combination of products and
services. Again, a forester would argue that he or she has always been in the
business of conservation in this sense (as indicated by the more traditional term of
‘conservator’).  ‘Protection’ also conjures up the image of leaving a forest totally
alone when, in practice, some management of invasive exotic species, fire etc. is
still likely to be required to conserve structure and composition.  If so, it would
appear that private interests will not result in protection because it yields no return
but does involve costs such as monitoring, fencing etc. In practice, private
interests may well engage in protection since private benefits can accrue from
conservation of the carbon content of the forest – see Section 8.5 - and protection
may be consistent with some uses of the protected forest, e.g. ecotourism.
Clearly, the language in the forest debate has varying interpretations. We attempt
a typology in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Typology of Forest Uses
Short-term Long-term
Timber Timber Multiple
purpose
Composition
and structure
Poorly
managed
Conventional
logging: short-
term timber
supplies, gener-
ally unsupervised
Well
Managed
Reduced impact
logging, probably
supervised
Sustainable
timber manage-
ment: long term
sustained
multiple benefits
Sustainable
forest manage-
ment: long
term sustained
multiple
benefits
‘Protection’:
probably
involving
some
management
74. The Meaning of ‘Optimal’ Forest Land Use
What is ‘optimal’ depends on the viewpoint of the economic agent making the
decision to convert forest land or to adopt a particular forestry regime. Hence we
need to identify the stakeholders.
From the standpoint of most logging companies a forest exists to be logged. In
principle, a forest will not be logged if it is unprofitable to do so, although it is
perfectly feasible that loggers may log land at a loss if subsidies prevail. If the
forest is profitable, the management regime used will generally be that which
maximises profits, subject to any regulations on harvesting that may be in place.
In addition to obligations under relevant legislation, logging companies may
voluntarily attenuate maximum profits if they feel some obligation towards the
environment. In some cases it would appear that the most profitable regime is not
employed. RIL might, for example, lower costs but not be used, perhaps because
of ignorance or for reasons that remain unclear.
Forest owners include local communities, indigenous groups, non-logging
companies and individuals. In these cases there may be a mix of motives with
regard to the forest: as a supplier of products, including timber; as an environ-
mental resource; as a stewardship objective, and so on.
From the standpoint of forest dwellers a forest exists to provide an array of
ecological and economic functions ranging from timber, fuelwood, and wildmeat
to protection against floods.
From the standpoint of poor agricultural colonists forests exist for the land they
provide for timber, crops and livestock, mainly the latter two. The productivity of
this land is temporarily advanced through burning and clearance, and may be
more permanently advanced by the use of inputs such as fertiliser. Such colonists
may nonetheless have complex mixes of motives. Thus, Mourato and Parikh
(1999) show that slash and burn cultivators in Peru exhibit a strong concern for
the conservation values of their forests. The image of colonists as being poor is
not always correct: they may also be wealthy individuals or companies looking to
exploit subsidies, to speculate on land values, or to anticipate conversion to
lucrative plantations and agro-industries.
From the standpoint of the conservationist the forest exists to provide ecological
functions, amenity and the provision of wellbeing to forest peoples. Motivations
vary and may range from a desire to make direct use of the forest (e.g. ecotourism)
to a concern for the intrinsic rights of biodiversity to exist.
8From the standpoint of national governments, forests may serve any of the above
functions depending on the extent to which governments have the wellbeing of
particular stakeholders at heart. They may prefer :
• logging to preservation because it provides employment and tax income;
• conversion because it may yield higher returns than timber production;
• conversion and colonisation because of the need to ‘establish’ political
frontiers and accommodate migrants;
• conservation because of a concern for vulnerable indigenous groups,
because of the potential income from sustainable uses of the forest,
because there are financial inducements to conserve, or because they
have forest protection as a general social objective.
From the standpoint of the world as a whole there may be a preference to log
forests for the valuable timber they contain, or to conserve forests for their local
and global ecological functions. In the latter case, there may be a preference to
conserve forests because of their role in providing biodiversity and in storing
carbon which would otherwise be released to the atmosphere, contributing to
global warming. The relevant agents reflecting ‘world’ interests include some
activities by bilateral and multinational aid agencies, various UN organisations not
directly involved with aid, the Global Environment Facility, and international
NGOs.
The viewpoints of the stakeholders necessarily conflict, otherwise there would be
no ‘forest problem’.  Different uses of forested land are often incompatible. The
only options for ‘resolving’ these conflicts of values are:
(1) to impose a given use on all stakeholders, regardless of the differences of
viewpoint. This ‘solution’ is potentially unstable because one or more
stakeholders will lose from the imposed land use. Hence they have a
continuing incentive to break the agreement by securing its subsequent
rejection, or by ‘illegally’ using the forest for their own purposes;
(2) to find an agreement which adopts a given use of the forest land and in
which those who lose are compensated in some way for forgoing their use
of the land. On this solution, all stakeholders are (ideally) better off with the
agreed land use than they were without it.
The second solution suggests the meaning of ‘optimal’: it is a land use which is
judged socially the most beneficial overall, but in which those who lose from the
9land use are compensated for their losses. This definition accords with elementary
game theory (for a brief introduction see Perman and McGillvray, 1999).
In practice, actual compensation for losses is often not feasible. At the very least
then, forest land should be allocated to those uses which maximise, as far as
possible, the aggregate social value of the forest land. If gains and losses are
measured in monetary terms, then this requirement is equivalent to a standard
cost-benefit analysis approach and the compensation is potential rather than
actual. Put another way, gainers have to be able to compensate losers and still
have net gains to show (Pearce, 1986). In practice, while we may not be able to
assign economic values to all functions, the cost-benefit approach is a reasonable
way of organising the framework for analysis.
A convenient language to describe stakeholders’ interests is that of ‘private’ and
‘social’ gains and losses. ‘Private’ refers to the private interests of the stakeholder,
i.e. what benefits him or her. ‘Social’ takes the wider, social perspective and the
jurisdiction may be local, national, regional or global. In theory, governments or
global agencies should take the social standpoint, but it is well known that this is
not always the case. Both perspectives are relevant to determining ‘optimal’ forest
land use because adopting a social perspective without acknowledging that some
stakeholders’ private interests may be compromised will, as noted above, be
potentially unstable. For an overview of conflicts in forest land use see Chapter 7
of Panayotou and Ashton (1992).
Table 1 encapsulates the different interests of the forest stakeholders, albeit in
simplistic terms. The reality is that motivations will often be complex mixes of
those shown.
Figure 2 shows competing and complementary forest land uses in diagrammatic
form. Note that conventional logging (CL) is potentially capable of leading to
protection if well managed logging occurs in an initial period after which loggers
leave the area and protective policies are introduced. CL is also, however, linked
to conversion since the initial period of logging opens up the forest area to
colonists and industrial uses through the construction of roads. Which of these
views is correct is an empirical matter. CL could, in principle, also lead to STM if
initial-phase loggers focus on only large specimens, collateral damage is
minimised and regeneration is fast. STM, of course, also opens up the forest and
relies for its avoidance of colonisation and conversion on the management of the
forest for longer-term purposes. In practice, CL followed by STM/SFM seems
unlikely due to soil and biomass damage in the CL phase.  Nonetheless, we retain
the possibility of the sequence from CL to STM/SFM.
Table 1: Motivations for stakeholder preferences for forest land use
Motivations for land use preference by stakeholder
Conversion -
agriculture
Conversion –
other
CL SFM Protection
Logger Profit if CL>SFM Profit if
SFM>CL
Forest dweller Timber and NTFPs
Owner (other  than
government)
Profit Profit Profit if CL>SFM Profit if SFM>CL,
or non-market
benefits of SFM
Stewardship
motives
Colonist
(poor and rich)
Profit Profit Profit May log more
sustainably
Possible?
Conservationist Timber and NTFPs
if RIL
Timber and NTFPs if
SFM  Protection
Ecological benefits
Government Employment
Migration
Border security
Employment
Border security
Roads
Tax revenues
Timber and NTFPs
if CL  Protection
Tax revenues
Timber and NTFPs if
SFM  Protection
Ecological benefits
World Timber and NTFPs
if CL  Protection
Timber and NTFPs
especially carbon
benefits.
Ecological benefits,
especially carbon
and biodiversity
Note: NTFP = non timber forest products
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Figure 2: Forest land use
OPTIMAL LAND
USE
CONVERSION NON-CONVERSION
Non
agricultural-
plantation, oil
palm etc
Agricultural Conventional
logging or
RIL
Protection Sustainable
forestry
Crops
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STM
SFM
Vs
STM
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5. The Meaning of Sustainable Forest Management
Optimal land use is not necessarily the same thing as sustainable land use (Toman
and Ashton, 1994)2. The current debate about forestry is partly about sustain-
ability, i.e. about making use of forested land in a sustainable fashion. In large
part, converting forest land to agriculture – in tropical regions – is not sustainable
because soils often do not have the capacity to sustain agricultural activity
indefinitely, although the case for perennials is far stronger in this respect. There
are, however, many cases in which tropical forests have been converted and
successful agriculture follows (see e.g. Schneider, 1995). In other cases, provided
suitable fallow periods prevail, forested land can be converted for short term
agricultural use and then be cleared again and reused after the fallow period. This
’cycle’ of agriculture and forest regeneration is also potentially sustainable.
As noted above, the debate about appropriate forestry mixes two different aspects
of sustainability:
(1) sustainable timber management (STM) in which the focus is on a sustained
yield of timber over long time periods; and
(2) sustainable forest management (SFM) in which the focus is on the many
products and services of the forest sustained over long periods of time.
While it is generally thought that STM is consistent with SFM, it is at least open
to argument that STM will give a less sustainable flow of non-timber products
relative to SFM. Thus, it is important to distinguish STM from SFM.
In sustainable timber management, timber is extracted with regard to a continuous
future supply of wood through investment in regeneration. STM also tends to be
associated with minimisation of damage to residual stands, a point emphasised by
Vanclay (1996), possible investment in finding uses for currently non-merchant-
able species, and accelerated growth of merchantable species in managed stands.
With SFM, non-timber products and ecological services may also be exploited,
e.g. through carbon trades, bio-prospecting, debt-for-nature swaps etc. Social uses
of forest may also be taken into account (indigenous peoples). Thus SFM is:
                                                
2 Optimality tends to be defined in terms of maximising the net present value (NPV) of the flow
of services from the forest resource.  Because of discounting, it may be possible to maximise
NPV from very short  term exploitation of the forest even if high economic values are attached
to long term benefits. Sustainable uses, on the other hand, may yield short term gains below
those of exploitative uses, but which extend into the indefinite future. Discounting the yields
over an infinite time horizon may nonetheless result in the short term use being favoured. On
the contrast between optimality and sustainability see Pearce (1999).
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‘management of primary or secondary forests for the sustained production
of timber or other products or both in which forest cover is maintained
indefinitely’ (Dickinson et al., 1996).
Reid and Rice (1997) suggest that the primary management objective of SFM is
‘obtaining a constant or increased flow of wood from a forest whose natural
structure and species composition are maintained to some degree, though
not entirely’,
a definition that, nonetheless, interestingly makes no reference to ecosystem
function or ecological processes. IFF (1999) state:
‘Non market forest goods and services and, moreover, cultural, spiritual and
ethical values of forests are fundamental considerations of sustainable
forest management. The importance of these contributions of forests should
not be contested in principle, even if they cannot be denominated in
monetary terms’.
This quotation emphasises the view that SFM extends way beyond products and
ecological services. Perhaps the most complete definition comes from Bruenig
(1996):
‘….management should aim at forest structures which keep the rainforest
ecosystems as robust, elastic, versatile, adaptable, resistant, resilient and tolerant
as possible; canopy openings should be kept within the limits of natural gap
formation; stand and soil damage must be minimised; felling cycles must be
sufficiently long and tree marking so designed that a selection forestry canopy
structure and a self regulating stand table are maintained without, or with very
little, silvicultural manipulation; production of timber should aim for  high quality
and versatility…..The basic principle is to mimic nature as closely as possible to
make profitable use of the natural ecosystem dynamics and adaptability, and
reduce costs and risks…’.
14
6. The Context for the Analysis
The context for the remainder of the paper is one where the starting point is an
existing forest. Thus, we do not discuss the optimal use of bare or degraded land.
Additionally, although land uses that involve conversion of the forest are relevant
to the analysis, they are incidental to the main focus which is on the appropriate
form of forestry. It may or may not be the case that land conversion is socially or
privately ‘better’ than a given forestry use.
Finally, outright protection is also relevant to the analysis but is not the main
focus. Like conversion, protection has to be part of the analysis because forest
practices are capable of being a precursor to a protected area classification.
Conventional logging, for example, is frequently a precursor to agricultural
colonisation, and hence land conversion. One current argument is that protection
might follow on from an initial period of logging.
15
7. The Private Interests of the Logging Companies
7.1 The empirical evidence
From the logging firm’s point of view, the use of the forest will be dictated by the
option providing the largest private financial rate of return. Empirical evidence
relating to these rates of return is limited. The results of a literature search are
given in Table 2. A particular problem concerns the fact that STM and SFM
systems have rarely been in place long enough for an accurate picture on financial
returns to be obtained (Dickinson et al., 1996). Furthermore, it is seldom to the
logging firm’s advantage to reveal the actual costs of logging operations. Double
accounting is therefore commonplace when record books are accessible at all.
Those few studies that compare STM/SFM and CL therefore tend to be based on
financial model simulations. Additionally, where there is additional evidence on
the rate of return to STM/SFM, the relevant studies often do not attempt a
comparison with CL, contenting themselves with a demonstration that STM/SFM
is profitable per se. Some of the analyses are also not very clear on precisely what
the forest ‘management’ regime is.
While the quality of the analysis in some of the studies leaves something to be
desired, the general conclusions emerging from Table 2 are:
(1) that STM is potentially profitable at ‘reasonable’ discount rates of, say 5-
10% (in real terms). It is possible that financial viability would be doubtful
at higher rates;
(2) that STM is almost systematically less profitable than ‘liquidation’ forestry
and other forms of conventional logging.
These conclusions echo those already reached by other commentators, e.g. Bach
and Gram (1996).
Nonetheless, while this inequality of profitability explains the widespread
preference of loggers for CL, it does not justify it. The reason for this, as indicated
previously, is that the financial cost benefit calculation of the logger is not the
same as that for society generally and certainly not for the world as a whole.
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Table 2: The financial profitability of STM/SFM and CL
Study Country Type offorestry
IRR, NPV
(DR)
Ratio profits
CL to SFM Comment
Bann, 1997 Cambodia STM, CL CL = $1,697 ha
STM = $408 ha
(6%)
4.1 90 yr x 3
cutting cycle
for STM; 30 yr
liquidation for
CL
Barreto et al,
1998
Brazil STM, CL $430 ha
(20%)
n.a STM profitable
Barros and
Uhl, 1995
Brazil CL 14-26% n.a Authors argue
STM is possible
Boscolo &
Mendelsohn
1998
Malaysia RIL vs CL $4400 ha CL
$2660 ha STM
1.66 STM Assumes
RIL and >60
cm dbh
Browder et
al., 1996
Brazil New
planting on
degraded
fallow; agro-
forestry;
mahogany
NPV = $226 ha
degraded fallow;
$-50 ha; agro-
forestry; $721 ha
pure stand
plantation
Not strictly
comparable to
other studies as
new planting
Bruenig (n.d) Malaysia CL vs STM CL>STM Quoted in FAO,
1999
Dixon et al.,
1994
Chile CL vs SFM $500-3000 per ha
more than SFM
FAO, 1997 Brazil RIL vs CL CL>STM? Not quantified
Hardner and
Rice, 1994
Brazil STM vs CL CL > STM
Howard and
Valerio, 1996
Costa Rica STM vs
conversion
STM in South
$1340-1612 per
ha; in North
$671-1142 per ha
(10%)
STM >
ranching but
possibly not
with crops
Strong
sensitivity to
parameters for
crops
Howard et
al., 1996
Bolivia STM vs CL CL $334-449 ha
STM $204-263
ha (10%)
1.3 – 1.7
Johns et al.,
1996
Brazil RIL vs CL 0.75 needs to be
checked
Kishor and
Constantino,
1993
Costa Rica STM vs CL
vs ranching
Liquidation=$12
92 ha
Ranching= $1319
ha
STM = $854 ha.
(8%)
1.50 Liquidation
involves 60%
cover removal
Haltia and
Keipi, 1997
Costa Rica STM vs
ranching
Managed nat.
forest $294 ha
better than
ranching
Reworks
Kishor and
Constantino
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Table 2:     continued
Kollert et al.,
1995
Malaysia STM CL > STM STM profitable
Kumari, 1996 Malaysia STM vs CL CL = $860-1380
ha
STM = $322-
$944 ha
1.5 – 1.7
(taking ‘best’
STM and
same damage
levels)
Laarman et
al., 1995
Philip-
pines
Community
forest, STM
STM = $638 ha
(12%)
STM profitable
Mendoza and
Ayemou,
1992
Ivory
Coast
STM vs CL STM +
processing =
$160 ha (10%),
but CL >STM
Check
Peters et al.,
1989
Peru SFM $933 ha (5%) 3.0 Disputed study
Pinedo-
Vasquez, et
al., 1992
Peru Community
forest, CL
254% return on
annual
investment
Check
Richards et
al., 1991
Mexico Community
forest, STM
14-15% annual
return on capital,
including
processing
Shawahid et
al., 1997
Malaysia Protection vs
RIL
Protection = 10.4
mR, RIL = 26.6
mR (DR=?)
n.a Protection less
desirable than
RIL
Southgate
and Elgegren,
1995
Peru STM Negative NPV Adverse public
policy and
guerrila
warfare. NPV
could have
exceeded
opp.cost of
STM
Stone, 1996 Brazil Unregulated
CL
8% profit margin
for small mills,
18% for large
mills
Revisits
Verissimo et
al., 1992
Uhl et al.,
1991
Brazil Selective cut
followed by
conversion
C100%
annual return
Verissimo et
al., 1995
Brazil Unregulated
single
selective cut,
but with
regeneration
28% annual
profit including
processing
Mahogany
‘mining’: few
trees left
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Table 2:     continued
Verissimo et
al., 1992
Brazil STM vs CL STM has 25%
annual return on
investment
including
processing
26 (10%)
19 (5%)
World Bank
(summarised
in Grut,
1990)
Ghana
Guinea
RIL
SFM
25% IRR at
border prices
34% IRR at
border prices
Use of border
prices indicates
an economic
analysis rather
than a financial
analysis
Sources and notes:
Two literature overviews form the core of the table (Gullison et al., 1998, and FAO, 1999), but
some entries have been modified and a number of additional studies have been added. IRR =
internal rate of return. NPV = net present value. Where available, discount rates used in the
studies are shown in brackets. ‘>’ means ‘more profitable than’.
7.2 Factors that could favour the financial profitability of  STM
Advocates of STM have drawn attention to four main factors that might increase
the financial return to STM relative to CL: discount rates, future price increases,
incremental growth rates for timber volume, and property rights.
7.2.1 The discount rate
One ‘price’ of potential importance for the SFM vs CL debate is the discount rate.
For the financial perspective the relevant discount rate is that of the logger or
concessionaire. For the national perspective, the relevant rate is the social discount
rate. The two rates can be expected to differ, with the social rate being below the
private rate (Pearce, 1986). Surprisingly little is known about discount rates in
developing countries. Some evidence exists on discount rates for agriculturists in
developing countries. For example, Cuesta et al., (1994) found that real personal
discount rates of farmers in Costa Rica were in the range of 15-22%, and they use
the finding to cast doubt on the economic feasibility of introducing soil
conservation measures. Aylward and Porras (1998) suggest that a social discount
rate for Costa Rica generally would be 7-10%, i.e. half the private rate. None-
theless, the range for the social rate is roughly in accord with the rates that have
been used in forest studies in Costa Rica. By far the most comprehensive analysis
is by Poulos and Whittington (1999) which covers the general public in Ethiopia,
Mozambique, Uganda, Indonesia ,Bulgaria and Ukraine. While not all of these are
countries with significant forest, they are typical of the range of forested countries.
Poulos and Whittington find that short-term personal discount rates are 45-206%
and longer term rates are11-28%. The long term rates are very consistent with the
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Cuesta, et al., (1994) study in Costa Rica. Rates this high would make it difficult
to justify even the most conventional of development projects. In the context of
forestry they are effectively fatal for any investment with a long-term focus.
The importance of the discount rate can be illustrated by Figure 3. There a hypo-
thetical flow of profits from CL and SFM is illustrated with the typical ‘hump’ of
returns under CL occurring early on. Annex 1 shows how the ‘switching’ discount
rate can be found, i.e. the rate which would make the NPV of the two profit
streams the same3.  While high personal discount rates appear to be the norm on
the basis of the empirical evidence, it is important to stress that few studies exist
that adopt rigorous methodologies for estimating those discount rates. Addition-
ally, some poor communities do manage timber production on a non-exploitative
basis, suggesting that communal discount rates may be markedly less than purely
personal rates (see Pinedo-Vazquez and Rabelo, 1999, on varzea logging).
Figure 3: Typical pattern of profit flows from CL and STM
Profit
                                                
3 Figure 3 assumes a constant discount rate over time. In practice, discount rates may vary with
time due to changes in personal circumstances.
CL cash
flow
STM cash
flow
Time
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7.2.2 Timber prices
If timber prices are expected to appreciate then there is some benefit to curtailing
cuts now in favour of the future (effectively, price increases can be thought of as a
deduction from the discount rate). But future timber prices are unlikely to grow
rapidly. Some of the high price increases simulated in the STM studies, e.g.
Howard and Valerio (1996), are based on protected forest industries. World prices
are a better guide. Moreover, world price (‘border prices’) would be the relevant
magnitude in economic, as opposed to financial, studies. Rice et al., (1998) use
2% p.a. growth in real prices which may, however, be an exaggeration of future
price increases. Work at Resources for the Future (Sohngen et al.,1997)  suggests
baseline price growth rates well under 1% p.a. for the next 100 years. Even with a
high demand scenario, price increases barely exceed 1% per annum over the next
60 years. These results are consistent with other estimates of long term trends –
e.g. see Brooks et al., (1996). Overall, it seems unlikely that future price increases
will confer significant advantages on STM relative to CL. More generally, as long
as timber is ‘abundant’, stumpage prices will be low, making STM financially
vulnerable (Southgate, 1998).
7.2.3 Timber volume growth rates
Timber volume growth rates have an effect similar to real relative price increases.
If growth rates are faster under STM then the difference can be regarded as the
equivalent of a reduction in the discount rate. Rice et al., (1998) suggest 2% p.a.
as an average for growth relevant to STM, i.e. 2% per annum in volume of the
stand. However, quotations of percentage growth rates are not very meaningful.
First, growth depends on stand condition such that growth is an inverse ‘U’
shaped curve relative to stand condition (low at poor states and low again if there
is high density and crowding, although the latter is rare in managed natural
forests) – see Vanclay (1994). Second, large trees may have small percentage
growth rates but substantial incremental yields in terms of cubic metres of wood.
Third, account has to be taken of damage in CL to residual trees (10-40 cm dbh)
that will form the next crop in polycyclic management operations. Surviving
damaged trees grow slowly and will not contribute to the next commercial  crop
due to stem defects. Most of the growth benefit from RIL and STM derives from
higher stocking and fewer weed dominated areas, such as vine blankets.
Overall, STM could easily result in volume increments of commercial species that
are 2-4 times higher than after CL.
7.2.4 Property rights
It is widely argued that insecure or short-term property rights encourage CL, so
that longer-term rights would encourage a switch to SFM, or at least STM. Rice et
al. (1998) accept the argument in principle but argue that longer-term concessions
would not alter the underlying financial costs and benefits, favouring CL. But
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tenure might also encourage better environmental choices of equipment and the
training of staff, or at least enable better choices to be made. Boscolo and Vincent
(1998) simulate the effects of longer-term concessions on the timing of harvests in
Malaysia and show that, on their model, it would make no difference. Generally, it
does not pay to leave trees standing4. Probably the best way to accommodate the
concession length issue is to regard longer concessions as an enabling device for
STM which, without additional incentives such as performance bonds, will
nonetheless be unlikely to lead to STM.
7.2.5 Efficiency and best practice
One remaining issue concerns the extent to which the STM systems observed in
Table 1 reflect ‘best practice’. That is, what is being observed may not be the most
efficient form of STM, making cost comparisons misleading. Various in-
efficiencies need to be addressed: (a) ratio of usable wood to cut wood; (b) ratio of
cut wood to wood at the mill gate, (c) ratio of mill output to mill input. Do (a) and
(b) vary by type of management regime? How do loggers respond to efficiency
improvements (and why don’t they adopt them automatically?). Part of the
problem seems to be that critics are damning STM as it has been practiced.
Defenders of STM and SFM are saying that past systems were poorly
implemented, e.g. by excessive canopy opening, inappropriate log transport,
inappropriate machinery, lack of training and planning, etc. In other words, we
need to know what would constitute an efficient system.
But what constitutes efficient STM or SFM may be rather like the Holy Grail,
since efficiency implies an agreed objective and the reality is that no such
consensus exists. Objectives might, for example, embrace recreating the original
stand, regenerating harvested species, conserving ‘habitat’ trees, minimising gaps,
and so on. The reality seems to be that SFM is itself  an ‘elastic’ concept, making
the criticism that it has not been practiced when it should have been, difficult to
evaluate.
7.2.6 Valorising non-commercial timber species
It has been argued that ‘valorising’ non-commercial timber stock will provide less
incentive to use regimes that damage residual stands (Buschbacher, 1990). Rice et
al (1998) argue, on the other hand, that expanding the commercial range of
species simply results in all species being exploited. The reality is complex and
                                                
4 The issue of concession length needs to be distinguished from the issue of allocating rents
where rent equals the difference between delivered log price and marginal cost, or, more
correctly, the difference between price and marginal social cost. It has often been argued that
rents should be taxed more heavily to discourage rent-seeking by loggers. But this is an issue of
desirable distribution of rents, not of efficiency. Efficient solutions are not affected by the
division of the rents between stakeholders. See Hyde and Sedjo (1992), Vincent (1993) and
Hyde and Sedjo (1993).
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depends on prices for such species, supervision and what the management regime
is trying to achieve. In Queensland, the valorisation of species took pressure off
the best and most accessible areas, and good supervision of the operations meant
that the additional species harvested did not result in degradation of the residual
stand (Vanclay, 1996). But it is hard to generalise on the valorisation issue.
7.2.7 Concessionaires and confidence
Sustainable forest practices involve having confidence in the long term future.
Many of the world’s most valuable forests are in areas where there is a potential
for rapid political change and the insecurity that it engenders. The effect of lack of
security will be to reduce confidence in the future and hence to favour short-run
exploitation. The effect is the same as that of a high discount rate.
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8. The National Perspective
The national perspective on land use options differs from the financial analysis
outlined above in several ways.
First, logging may not be the ‘best’ use of the forest land, so that the options on
land use broaden to those set out in Figure 1.
Second, attention now has to be paid to the sequencing of land use. Figure 1
suggests one possibility is that logging is followed be either protection or
conversion (and to which we might add abandonment). Which one follows will
determine the flow of costs and benefits to the nation.
Third, financial gains and losses should no longer be as relevant as economic
gains and losses, i.e. financial flows should be shadow priced.
Fourth, all forest values other than timber values become relevant.
Fifth, if global values exist and can be converted to resource flows of benefit to
the nation, then they too become relevant.
We address each modification in turn.
8.1 Widening the options to all forest land uses
Figure 2 shows a set of alternative forest land uses. In practice there will be
combinations of uses that should also be considered, e.g. agro-forestry, clearance
for plantation forestry, oil palm, etc. But the principle is the same, whereas a
private logger might reasonably consider only the financial costs and benefits of
logging options, the nation state should consider all options and evaluate their
economic value.
8.2 Sequencing of land use
Surprisingly little attention appears to be paid in the CL ‘vs’ SFM debate to the
sequencing issue. It is well known that logging opens up frontier land which may
then be colonised by agriculturists5. Repetto (1990) is of the view that most
deforestation arises from the initial action of logging which creates access to
hitherto inaccessible forest land. In their review of econometric studies of
deforestation Kaimowitz and Angelsen (1998) find that deforestation is higher
when land is accessible, when timber and agricultural prices are high (encouraging
                                                
5  Sequencing may happen the other way round. The land may initially be cleared for agriculture
and taking timber may be an ancillary operation aimed at helping recover the costs of
conversion.
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logging and conversion), when rural wages are low and when there are
opportunities for long distance trade. Of these factors, several – accessibility,
timber prices, and trade potential – all relate to logging. Southgate (1998)
documents cases where most road construction in forested areas has come from
loggers, encouraging conversion to cropland and pasture. Low stumpage prices
might contribute to conversion since even the modest rates of return that might be
expected from agriculture compare favourably to forestry at low stumpage prices.
This picture contrasts with the one suggested by some analysts who argue that CL
could be followed by outright protection (Rice et al., 1998a; Rice et al 1998b;
Cannon et al., 1998). The argument here is as follows: loggers are unlikely to
return to the same area after the initial logging phase because
(a) they do not practice sustainable forestry, thus making future timber stands
unlikely to be of commercial interest, and
(b) because they have high discount rates, also making future yields
unattractive.
The land is therefore potentially available for protection without the further threat
of logging. The argument has some force, but there are several problems.
First, the picture of loggers entering an area only once is often not accurate.
Loggers often return 5-10 years after the first harvest to harvest trees that have
become commercially valuable because of changes in transport infrastructure, in
milling methods and market potential.  The later phase, re-entry loggers may also
be different people to the first-time entrant: smaller operators with lower operating
costs acting as agents for small mills working in formerly high graded areas. The
‘protect after logging‘ scenario thus has to relate to a context in which the threat of
subsequent logging interventions remains.
Second, even if the threat of further logging is removed, the threat of colonisation
for non-timber purposes is not removed and, indeed, is, ex hypothesi, more likely.
Colonisation here may be for subsistence agriculture but also for far more
attractive agro-industrial use such as oil palm. Additionally , the ‘logging followed
by protection’ view is based on what could happen rather than on what actually
has happened in the past. However, there is an argument that says protection is
easier after CL because land prices fall once loggers withdraw. Land can then be
bought cheaply for protection purposes.
Third, CL may result in such significant degradation that what is left is not worth
protecting.  Substantial opening of canopies results in increased susceptibility to
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fires and  increases in the likelihood of weed infestations. A spiral of degradation
soon becomes irreversible.
Conventional logging followed by protection has indeed occurred, for example in
Queensland, in the Noel Kemp Mercado carbon offset project in Bolivia, and in
parts of Africa. But how far these examples arise simply because there were funds
available for subsequent protection and because there was low population pressure
on available land is unclear. Indeed, it is hard to envisage many circumstances in
which there will be limited pressures to convert the land. The choice is then not
often between ‘logging followed by protection’ and SFM/STM, but between some
form of continuous forestry and land conversion. The potential for logging  to be
followed by protection may therefore be smaller than some of the literature
acknowledges, although Reid and Rice (1997) accept that STM will be best suited
to areas where there are strong pressures to colonise the forest for conversion.
And, of course, protection is costly and in no way avoids the need for continued
management.
One other form of sequencing has strong arguments in its favour. Here the aim
would be to meet timber demand from plantations, leaving natural forests to be
managed mostly for non-timber purposes.  The sequence is then to afforest rapidly
to establish plantations on degraded lands, accepting some loss of natural forest in
the interim, then declaring the remaining natural forest to be protected whilst
meeting demand for timber from plantations. Hunter (1998) describes this
situation for New Zealand. That such a policy works for New Zealand, and has
been suggested in the USA where some environmental groups are calling for
cessation of all logging on in National Forests,  carries the suggestion that this
option is best for countries with relatively high levels of per capita income. A
country like Malaysia, where there are already extensive lowland plantations,
could adopt such a policy, but lower income countries are still likely to face
formidable pressures for conversion of natural forest, so that finding profitable
forest management systems is still important6.
Again, it needs to be recalled that protection is not costless. Not only are there
continuing management costs, but there are capital costs of fencing and
management institutions. To these must be added the value of the protected land
in its forgone use(s).
                                                
6 The New Zealand and Malaysia examples raise the interesting issue of whether there might be
an ‘environmental Kuznets curve’ (EKC) for forest protection. EKCs exist when growth in
income per capita first results in environmental degradation and then, after some turning point, a
reduction in degradation. Such curves have been found for air pollution. In the current case, the
hypothesis would be that countries opt for more forest protection and more plantations as
incomes pass a certain point.
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8.3 Shadow pricing private costs and benefits
The analyses of costs and benefits to loggers have typically all been in terms of
financial rather than economic flows. Exceptions, noted in Table 2, are the World
Bank studies reported by Grut (1990).
8.4 Allowing for non-timber values
Allowing for non-timber values of  the forest alters the focus of analysis from
STM to SFM. In economic language, the relevance measure is now total
economic value (TEV) from the different possible land uses. TEV comprises use
and non-use values and both are capable of expression in monetary terms by
estimating the relevant willingness to pay (WTP) for those functions (Pearce,
1993, 1996).7 The basic argument is that, even if STM is ‘worse’ than CL in
financial terms, if the WTP for the incremental non-timber benefits of  SFM
exceeds the financial deficit, SFM will be preferred from a national perspective.
More formally,
SFM > CL, if  WTPntv > Πcl - Πstm ….[1]
Where ‘ntv’ is non-timber values and Π is profit.
Bawa and Seidel (1998) say there is no experience of timber regimes that integrate
NTPs into the management system, but this does not square with Putz (1992), or
with empirical experience from Costa Rica (Romero, 1999) and Nicaragua
(Salick, 1995). Romero (1999) found that RIL had no effect on the available
biomass of epiphytic bryophyes that are harvested and sold by local people.
Similarly, Salick (1995) found that NTFPs and natural forest management for
timber were compatible in Nicaragua.  In small scale natural forests integration of
NTFPs with timber is more the rule than the exception (see Pinedo-Vazquez and
Rabelo, 1998).  However,  Putz et al., (1999) note that management invariably
involves favouring some wildlife species over others.
8.4.1 The evidence on environmental impacts of logging regimes
The presumption in inequality [1] above is that environmental benefits under
STM/SFM exceed those under CL. This has been challenged by Rice et al (1997,
1998a, 1998b). They argue that the physical effects of CL on the forest were
relatively mild for the case they studied in lowland Bolivia. However, that case
relates to extremely low intensity mahogany harvesting, and it would be hard to
envisage that it would also hold for the much more intensive harvesting character-
                                                
7 It is important to understand that all ‘prices’ in economics reflect willingness to pay. Some
commentators limit WTP to expressions of WTP derived from questionnaire surveys. This is not
correct. All market prices, for example, reflect the WTP of consumers for the product in
question.
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istic of the eastern Amazon, or the dipterocarp forest of southeast Asia. Rice et al.,
(1998) and Reid and Rice (1997) argue that STM/SFM can be just as destructive
of the total forest as CL, a view supported by Bawa and Seidler (1998). Un-
controlled logging, it is argued, may be comparatively benign, especially on flat
lands that are logged when soils are dry and where there is a low density of
commercially exploitable species. Without the prior topographical, soil traffic-
ability and density conditions, however, CL may be very destructive. STM can be
destructive if it involves major canopy clearance in an effort to encourage
regeneration of light demanding species, but much depends here on the manage-
ment system in place (see below).
Extrapolation from single site studies, however, is dangerous.  Manokaran (1998)
describes the effects of selective logging in Pasoh, Malaysia. Contrary to state-
ments that no selective logging system has been successful (Rice et al., 1998),
Manakoran finds that the Malayan Uniform System (MUS) of selective cutting in
the 1950s successfully regenerated the basal area of primary forest which, by the
mid 1990s, was well stocked with commercially valuable dipterocarp species. He
contrasts this with the far less successful selective management systems (SMS)
being practised in the hill forests.  Moreover, the Queensland experience of over
one hundred years of logging and close to SFM also suggests that selective
logging can be successful (Vanclay, 1994, 1996).
Biodiversity
Part of the problem with the discussion on environmental impacts concerns the
characterisation of the environmental objectives of forest management. Whereas
Rice et al., (1997) talk primarily in terms of the maintenance of biodiversity,
others would argue that what matters is the maintenance of ecosystem functions
and ecological processes. Some of the concern about avoiding management-
induced changes in tropical forest composition is based on the concept of ‘climax
communities’, and the idea that tropical forests are unchanging and lacking in
resilience. Given the long history of substantial human impacts on tropical forests
and the large areas of tropical forest currently under some sort of silvicultural
management by people, the incompatibility of management for timber with bio-
diversity maintenance seems largely unfounded. For example, many researchers
have reported that stands with mahogany almost certainly suffered severe natural
disturbances in the past, or regenerated in agricultural clearings that were
abandoned centuries ago. Despite this evidence for ecological resilience, much
more research is needed on how to mitigate the deleterious impacts of forest
management operations. For example, how should untreated reserves be
distributed within managed forests, and is it preferable, from a biodiversity main-
tenance perspective, to concentrate or disperse logging operations?
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But even at the level of biodiversity the issue is far from clear cut.  First, all forest
management is likely to reduce biodiversity relative to pre-intervention
conditions, or at least to change species composition. The very term ’manage-
ment’ means that something is being done to the forest that would not have
happened without intervention. Second, the issue then becomes one of comparing
the biodiversity profile – i.e. the nature and extent of diversity - under the different
management regimes, say SFM and CL. Thus, Rice et al., (1998b) make a
biodiversity conservation argument in favour of introducing protection after
logging has taken place. They suggest that even CL followed by protection is
superior to STM/SFM because the former halts the process of forest domestication
But this is a double edged argument, for CL could just as easily result in the loss
of species dependent on large canopy openings or for regeneration pioneer
species.  Certainly, CL stands are especially prone to weed infestations due to
excessive damage and lack of pre- or post-logging treatments to discourage weeds
and encourage potential crop trees. Even though it does not constitute STM or
SFM, reduced impact logging (RIL) would be a substantial step in the right
direction. Thus, pre-felling vine cutting can substantially reduce post-logging
incidence of serious vine infestations, and also reduce logging damage where
vines tie together tree crowns. RIL thus constitutes a major step forward.
Additionally, there has been a tendency to generalise from single area case
studies. The work of Rice et al., relies heavily on observations in the dry forests of
Northern Bolivia where, if sustainable timber exploitation for the species currently
harvested is to be practiced, substantial canopy manipulation is required in order
to provide the conditions for the regeneration of light-demanding species,
especially Swietenia macrophylla. The structure and composition of the forest
would thus have to change in a substantial way to avoid loss of the currently most
valuable species of canopy trees. Even for these forests, it is unclear that species
loss due to management need be significant. These forests have survived major
disturbances in the past, and proper zoning of the forest should ensure biodiversity
is retained.
Not all commercially valuable timber tree species require substantial canopy
disturbance for regeneration. In southeast Asia dipterocarp forests, for example,
minimising damage to residual stands is important to protect the abundant
advanced regeneration of commercial species present before harvesting and to
reduce the likelihood of  vine infestation once the canopy is opened. The valuable
canopy dominants in the forests of much of the Guyana Shield area in northern
South America are also negatively affected by the substantial canopy openings
required to regenerate mahogany in northern Bolivia.
Thus, it is not possible to say that STM systems necessarily result in less
biodiversity than CL systems. Without careful management, they may do so. If
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one of the aims is to conserve biodiversity then management systems should be
capable of achieving that aim.  In doing so, it may well be the case that the
financial returns to STM fall since there will often be a trade-off between
biodiversity objectives and maximum financial return. Given that biodiversity
conservation figures prominently in Forest Stewardship Council certification, any
price or marketing gains from certification will also reduce the profit differential
between CL and SFM.
An interesting study by Stephens (1999) in South Australian Eucalyptus regnans
forests shows that conservation strategies for Leadbeater’s possum are best
effected through forest reserves, with a close running second best approach being
modified harvesting regimes, and with both strategies being preferred over longer
rotations. ‘Best’ and ‘better’ in this context are measured by the survival prob-
ability of Leadbeater’s possum (the ‘effectiveness’ of the strategy) and the forgone
timber values (the cost). The modified harvesting regimes involved the retention
of small habitat patches within harvested areas, suggesting, again, that careful
logging is consistent with biodiversity protection.
Carbon
Forest-based carbon sequestration, both by conserving carbon already stored in
forests and  by sequestering additional carbon by stimulating tree growth, has
become an important focus for foresters because of the role that forest carbon
release plays in accelerating global warming. This role was given official
recognition in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 Framework Convention on
Climate Change. Countries can benefit in terms of achieving their emission
reduction targets by engaging in ‘carbon trades’ whereby they offset some of their
own emission targets by reducing net emissions in another country. The issue here
is how different management regimes affect carbon storage.
Silvicultural practices affect carbon balances. Thus, if vines are cut and left to
decompose, carbon is released in the short term from the decomposition process,
but can be offset later by the faster growth of the trees that are now free of the
vines. SFM, practised properly, involves minimum site preparation and extended
rotations, whereas clear cutting results in loss of necromass and soil organic
matter which may well not be offset by subsequent sequestration through faster
tree growth. In general, then, silvicultural practice benefits the carbon balance.
Exceptions might include savannah woodlands (e.g. the pine forests of Central
America) that are invaded by shade tolerant and less fire resistant trees. Restoring
the open stands will result in carbon releases that may not be compensated for by
increasing sequestration in the remaining trees.
Dixon (1997) conducts a survey of experience with silvicultural practices in forty
countries. Dixon’s results are shown in Table 3. The analysis suggests that silvi-
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cultural practices can result in additional sequestration or conservation of carbon
ranging from 5tC to 41tC depending on latitude.  Dixon suggests that if these
practices were applied to the 600 million ha of land suitable  for forest
management in the nations surveyed, conservation of carbon would be of the
order of  100-300 mtC p.a. over a 50 year period8. The economic efficiency of
such measures is unlikely to compare favourably to the costs of reducing green-
house gas emissions through energy-related schemes, or from plantations, but
Dixon suggests that the practices in question could sequester carbon at some $13
tC.  This is lower than the $20-30 tonne often quoted.
Table 3: Dixon’s survey estimates of incremental carbon sequestration
from silvicultural practices
Latitude Practice TCha-1p.a
High 60-90o Fertilisation
Thinning
Weeding
Drainage
Median value
1-16
3-  7
1-  3
3-11
5
Mid  30-60o Fertilisation
Thinning
Weeding
Median value
2-  28
15-65
8-  34
22
Low   0-30o Fertilisation
Thinning
Median value
26-71
18-64
41
Source: Dixon (1997).
In comparative simulations of carbon sequestration in Malaysian forests logged by
trained crews following RIL guidelines and with CNV methods, Pinard and Putz
(1996) (see also Boscolo and Vincent, 1998, which adopts the Pinard-Putz
estimates) showed that the use of RIL techniques conserved carbon in the
harvested stands and resulted in substantially greater rates of post-harvesting
                                                
8 For reference, global emissions of CO2 are some 6.2 billion tC, so that the potential from
improved silvicultural practice amounts to 1.6% to 4.8% of world emissions.
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sequestration due to higher stocking of potential crop trees and fewer problems
with vines and other weeds.
An interesting study by Solberg (1997) suggests that if carbon is valued at $50 tC,
approximately the level of the Norwegian carbon tax, the value of Norwegian
forests would increase by 2-30 times the value of timber output. If forests are
managed according to their mixed timber and carbon value, as opposed to their
timber value alone, significant changes would need to occur in management
practices. Standing volumes and rotation ages would need to be increased, and
there would need to be substantial increases in investment in silviculture.  Leakage
issues would loom large under such a scenario, given the large and growing
international demand for paper and other wood fibre products. With long
rotations, natural forest succession would occur which, in some cases, would
reduce the attractiveness of forests for early successional species of plants and
animals, as well as for recreation, so some of the ‘carbon gains’ would be offset
by other factors. Despite these misgivings, the clear implication is that the
attachment of economic values to carbon via trading and/or meeting domestic
emission reduction targets could substantially favour better managed forests9.
Numerous ‘carbon offset’ projects exist either in actual or simulated form
(simulations often involve actual projects which are not primarily designed to
reduce carbon emissions, but which are being ‘tracked’ to see if the carbon
benefits would make a significant difference; other simulations exist that are not
associated with particular projects). Details of the various deals and their costs per
tonne of carbon reduced can be found in Pearce et al., (1998). Few of the deals
relate to forest management. The offset projects can be analysed to elicit the
average costs per tonne of carbon equivalent reduced. However, since the deals
have not generally been developed on a cost efficient basis (selecting the cheapest
options first) such an analysis is not particularly helpful. Estimates of the prices at
which carbon will trade under the ‘flexibility mechanisms’ in the Kyoto Protocol
do, however, suggest that around $10 tC is likely to be a mean price, provided
substantial trading takes place. As the USA is committed to meeting some three-
quarters of its Kyoto target by trading (US Administration, 1998), and the
European Union has recently announced that it may permit up to 50% of its own
target to met from trading, the market could be substantial. A suggested guideline
is that carbon may trade at between $5 and $15 tC. The importance of these
figures can readily be seen. For forest conservation as a whole, compared to
conversion, forests may secure a carbon ‘credit’ of $75o to $2250 per hectare on
this basis10. For the comparison between SFM and CL, of course, the gains would
                                                
9 But for a sceptical view see Smith et al. (1999b).
10 Assuming 50tC to 150tC is emitted by conversion. See Annex 3.
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be far more modest. If Dixon’s figures (Dixon, 1997) are adopted, incremental
gains over CL may range from 5-41tC, or  $25 to $615 ha.
However, great care needs to be taken in multiplying carbon storage or
sequestration estimates by unit money values for  traded carbon. The procedure is
correct if the price of traded carbon is an equilibrium price, i.e. one that equates
supply and demand for traded carbon. That price will be sensitive to the number
of deals done. If there are vast ‘offers’ of carbon from countries seeking to
capitalise on the carbon value of sustainable forestry, it may have the effect of
forcing the price of carbon down, thus reducing the economic returns from carbon
conservation. These ‘system wide’ effects have been stressed in a number of
studies, e.g. Sohngen et al., (1998).
8.4.2 Willingness to pay for certified timber
There are two approaches to securing an economic measure of the value of non-
timber forest values. The first rests on what people are willing to pay for timber
certified as coming from ‘sustainable’ forests, the idea being that ‘sustainable’
timber embodies all non-timber values in some premium over the world price for
timber. The second attempts directly to estimate the economic value of the various
forests functions independently.
If consumers of wood products are willing to pay a premium to guarantee that the
forests supplying the products are sustainably managed, then that willingness to
pay can be thought of as an approximation of the WTP in equation [1] above.
Similarly, if forest companies are willing to adopt sustainable practices in order to
secure some marketing gain from certification, then the costs of certification
provide a lower bound of the additional value of certification.
Certification schemes exist to guarantee the sustainability of various forests, akin
to ‘eco-labelling’ of various products. Various certifying bodies are accredited by
the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and 3.5 m cubic metres of certified timber
entered international trade in 1996, whilst 10 million ha of forests has been
certified by 1998 (Crossley and Points, 1998). Certification costs are around $0.2
to 1.7 per ha for developing countries (Crossley and Points, 1998) and 9-12 cents
per acre for assessment and 1-3 cents per acre per annum for licensing and
auditing  in the USA (Mater et al., 1999). Accordingly, any WTP above this level
of cost represents the ‘net premium’ for SFM.
The evidence on the premium consumers are WTP for certified timber is mixed. A
survey of four studies in Barbier et al., (1994) revealed the following:
(a) a survey of  UK manufacturers in 1990 suggested 65% were WTP more for
certified timber;
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(b) a survey of UK consumers in 1991 suggested a 13-14% premium WTP
(c) a survey of UK consumers in 1992 indicated that 58% would not buy
timber if they knew it came from rainforests, and
(d) a 1992 survey of timber importers suggested that 70% thought their
customers were not willing to pay for certified timber.
An additional survey in British Columbia  suggests that 67% of respondents to a
survey would pay 5% more for certified timber, and 13% said they would pay
10% more (Forsyth et al, 1999).
Crossley and Points (1998) suggest that certified products are securing premia of
5-15% in some cases, but that the real benefits of certification for industry lie in
securing greater market share and longer term contracts. There is some evidence
that companies gaining certification secure higher company value, i.e. the value of
certification shows up in share prices on the stock exchanges.
If we take the 5-15% range as a likely measure of premium, the argument in
Gullison (1995) and Rice et al (1997) is that this is far from sufficient to
compensate for the additional profitability of CL over SFM as shown in Table 2.
But their argument is suspect. Table 2 suggests that a typical ratio of financial
profits for CL relative to STM would be, say, 1.5. For STM to become
competitive it is not necessary for prices to rise by 50%. A hypothetical numerical
example should suffice to show that the price premium need only be a fraction of
the difference in profits between CL and STM. If costs of CL are 75 and those for
STM are 100, but both face the same market price of 150, then the ratio is 75/50 =
1.5, similar to that found in Table 2. The net price premium that will make profits
equal is given by
p* = (CST-CCL)/P
where P is the common log price. In the numerical example, p* = 17% (25/150),
which is considerably different to 50%. It is true that this premium is gross of
certification costs, so that the true price premium required for parity between
profits in the two regimes is higher than 17%.
8.4.3 Willingness to pay for non-timber products and services
A more direct approach is to seek the willingness to pay people express for the
particular non-timber products and services from forests. We review what is
known about these WTPs. But note that they need to be applied to the differential
flow of  environmental products and services from SFM as opposed to forests that
are just logged. The total values would be relevant if all such services were lost, as
they might be from forest conversion. The differential values are relevant for the
CL/SFM comparison. The importance of this distinction is that we know a
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reasonable amount about the economic value of forest services, but, apparently,
little about the differential flows of those services according to different forest
management regimes.
Environmental economists have made great progress in eliciting economic values
for forest products and services. Recent surveys include: Godoy et al., (1993),
Pearce and Moran (1994), Gregersen et al., (1995), Lampietti and Dixon (1995),
Southgate (1996), Chomitz and Kumari (1996), Pearce (1998), and Pearce et al
(1999).  The Gregersen et al., study is not comprehensive and tends to exaggerate
the problems of applying valuation techniques, whilst some of the others are
already dated11.
There are of course substantial difficulties in reaching general conclusions from
WTP studies, primarily because appropriate guidelines for carrying out such
studies, such as those set out in Godoy et al., (1993) and Godoy and Lubowski
(1992) have not been followed. The result has been a mixture of legitimate and
illegitimate valuation procedures. The types of mistake made have included
generalisation from studies of a small area of forest to wider areas, with little
regard for (a) the fact that the area in question will not be typical of the whole
forest area simply because of variations in distance to market, and (b) ignoring the
fact that, in a hypothetical world where the whole forest was exploited for non-
timber products, the prices, and hence the profitability, of non-timber production
would fall. Another methodological issue is the extent to which values are based
on maximum sustainable yield or on actual harvests, which are often very much
less, i.e. the values that emerge are sensitive to what is assumed about the
management regime in place. Godoy et al., (1993) also point out that some studies
value the stock and some the flow, the former being an interesting measure for
wealth accounting but of little value when comparing competing land use values.
Studies also vary as to whether they report gross revenues or revenues net of
labour and other costs. Finally, little account has been taken in many of the studies
of the extent to which the relevant non-timber activity is itself sustainable, so that
what is being compared may well be two non-sustainable land use options.
Annex 2 provides an overview of what is known about non-timber values based
on WTP studies.
Extracting some kind of consensus from the estimates in Annex 2 is clearly
hazardous. We can speculate on the following annual values but care needs to be
taken in generalising any of these numbers (Southgate et al., 1996):
                                                
11 IFF(1999) also reviews valuation in the context of forests but the review is rather limited in
scope.
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Non-timber extractive Values: $               50 ha
Non-extractive:
recreation $        5 -   10 ha
ecological $                30 ha
carbon $     600-4400 ha
Non-Use $          2 -  27 ha
Whichever way the analysis is done, the major role of carbon values is revealed.
Should, for some reason, global warming not remain a serious issue of concern,
then tropical forests might be found to have measured environmental value of
around $100 per hectare, far from enough to justify outright protection on
economic grounds.
8.4.4 Kumari’s study for Malaysia
One of the few studies that attempts to place an economic value on the differential
flows of  goods and services from CL and SFM is Kumari (1995, 1996) for the
peat swamp forests of North Selangor in Malaysia. The analysis relates to the
differential benefits of moving from an existing unsustainable timber management
system, based on Malaysian Stateland forest practice, to sustained forest manage-
ment overall. Various degrees of sustainability are addressed to allow for the
trade-off between sustained timber and non-timber products and services. The
results are shown below.
NPV 1990 US$/ha at 8% discount rate
Unsustainable
CL
Sustainable
option 1
Sustainable
option 2
Sustainable
option 3
Timber values 1380 944 700 510
Local/national
non-timber values
251 308 447 563
Global values 3356 3645 3658 3668
Total 4987 4897 4805 4741
Notes: assumes 20% damage case. Kumari (1996) also estimates NPV for a 50%
damage case. M.ringits converted to $ at 2.5 R per $. Option 3 is more sustainable
than 2, 2 is more sustainable than 1.
Assuming constant damage from logging across all management schemes, CL
would be preferred to each of the sustainable options, although the uncertainty in
the approaches used to value the impacts is such that the statistical significance of
the differences shown above is unlikely to be high. However, Kumari (1996)
argues that the damage rate will be much higher, at 50%, for the least benign
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forms of timber extraction, the first two columns above. In that case the total
damages would change as follows:
Total 4092 4252 4805 4741
The sustainable systems are now markedly better than the unsustainable systems.
The ‘best’ sustainable system shows a 13% improvement on the ‘best’
unsustainable system.
The national non-timber benefits comprise rattan, bamboo, recreational and water
benefits, together with ago-hydrological benefits because of the regulation of
water supplies. The global benefits comprise endangered species and carbon, with
the latter being the most important. The economic values shown reflect (a) the
difference in unit ‘prices’ (WTP) applied to the impacts, and (b) the differences in
ecological impacts. Taking the ‘best’ sustainable option (2) and comparing it to
the base case of unsustainable management which maximises timber benefits
alone, the incremental changes are as follows:
Increase in NPV for Option 2 relative to
unsustainable base case. NPV 1990 $US/ha
Timber -160
National non-timber +225
Global +648
Total +713
Whereas timber benefits decline, as would be expected from the analysis in Table
2 of this analysis which shows relative profitability of timber from different
regimes , non-timber and global benefits increase more than enough to offset the
losses.
How typical this analysis is for forests generally is of course open to serious
question. In this case, for example, the agro-hydrological benefits account for
about two-thirds of the national non-timber incremental benefits, rattan accounting
for the rest. The fairly dominant role of carbon is borne out by the review in
Annex 2, even though Kumari uses different (and lower) carbon values.
Additional questions arise with respect to the economic analysis itself since it uses
several ‘benefits transfer’ estimates (essentially, borrowing WTP figures from
other studies). It is known that benefits transfer is subject to significant margins of
error. Most importantly, the global benefits will not accrue to forest owners or
concessionaires without institutional change which compensates them for storing
carbon in the biomass. Existing carbon trades, and those expected under the Kyoto
Protocol, thus become extremely important. In essence, Kumari’s analysis
37
provides the ‘demonstration’ phase, but not the capture phase of the analysis, as
she herself notes.
Nonetheless, Kumari’s approach, which is essentially traditional incremental cost-
benefit analysis, is the correct one and is likely to be the only one that can capture
all the relevant changes in the multiple outputs of different forest management
regimes.
8.4.5 Bann’s study for Cambodia
Bann (1997) reports detailed economic values for timber, non-timber products and
environmental benefits for forest land in Ratanakiri, Cambodia. The analysis is
interesting since it suggests that, for this case, NTFPs alone represent the best use
of the forest land, although there is a crucial difference between actual, current
rates of collection and those that could be obtained, the latter being based on a full
forest inventory. The essential results are shown below (with corrections as there
are several wrong totals in the original and environmental benefits are wrongly
treated in the summary table).
NPV at 6% US$/ha
Existing
sustainable
NTFP collection
Potential
sustainable
NTPF collection
Sustainable
timber
Unsustainable
timber
NTFPs:
Malva nuts
Rattan
Bamboo
697 3811
23
88
0 0
Environmental
benefits:
Biodiversity
Watershed
Carbon
511
76
7
511
76
7
Assumed to be
half NTPF
scenarios = 297
0
Timber 0 0 408 1697
Total 1291 4516 705 1697
The columns show the net present value of each option. The first column of
results shows the existing practice. The next column shows the social benefits if
the existing practice was used to full potential. The final columns show sustain-
able and unsustainable timber regimes.
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Bann’s conclusion is that the inventory-based NTFP scenario, i.e. utilising NTFPs
to the full, would maximise economic returns. Note, however, that if NTFPs are
ignored, unsustainable timber is to be preferred even allowing for the higher
environmental benefits of the sustainable timber option. The NPV arising from
actual collection of NTFPs does not compare with CL either. Bann’s conclusions
echo those of Peters et al (1989) for the Peruvian Amazon. However, that study
has been severely criticised on methodological grounds (e.g. Godoy et al., 1993),
and is also not consistent with later work on NTFP yields (Phillips, 1993).
8.4.6 Shawahid et al., study for Malaysia
While not a comprehensive study, Shahwahid et al., (1997) and Shahwahid et al.,
(1998) suggest the interesting finding that RIL forestry in Hulu (Ulu) Langat
Forest Reserve, Selangor is preferable to outright protection. Total protection is
assumed to have zero timber production, positive water yield benefits and
sedimentation protection benefits for a nearby hydro-electric power station.
Outright protection results in a NPV of 10.4 million ringits, whereas RIL results in
26.6 million ringits due to the gain in timber production and the limited impact on
hydroelectric power.
8.4.7 Mattsson’s study for Sweden
Mattsson (1994) reports a partial economic valuation study of different timber
regimes for northern Sweden. He compares clear cutting combined with artificial
regeneration and natural regeneration using advance growth or seed trees.
Contingent valuation was used for a sample of 800 people in the county where the
forest is located. Respondents were asked their willingness to pay for different
landsacpes without being told that the various depictions reflected different silvi-
cultural regimes. Depending on the mixtures of pine and broadleaves, the average
willingness to pay for natural regeneration systems varied from about 700 SEK to
3000 SEK per individual per year. Mattsson notes that his findings are consistent
with general preference surveys in Sweden which find that people are opposed to
clear felling.
8.4.8 Yaron’s study for Cameroun
Yaron (1999) and Groosman and Yaron (1999) investigate the potential for forest
conservation in the Mount Cameroun area. The land use options considered are (a)
oil palm and rubber plantations, (b) sustainable forest use and (c) subsistence-
oriented agriculture (‘chop farms’). Since only one type of forest management
option is considered, the analysis does not shed much light on the issue of forest
management choice. Nonetheless, it is significant that SFM is economically the
preferable option in each of the five regions studies, as shown in Table 4.
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Table 4: Net economic returns to SFM in Mt Cameroun area over and
above next  best use of the land
(NPV in UK£ per ha at 10% discount rate)
Area A Area B Area C Area D Area E
Next best use Chop farm Chop farm Chop farm Chop farm Chop farm
Direct use
value
NTFPs
Carbon
Medicinal
plants
Flood
prevention
Preventing
sedimentation
NUV
-884
+8
+971
+1
0
+8
+62
-790
+15
+971
+2
+120
+7
+62
-271
+14
+1090
+2
+136
+11
+62
-521
+14
+864
+2
+168
+3
+62
+1537
+14
+981
+2
0
+65
+62
Total + 166 +387 +1046 + 591 +2661
Source: Yaron (1999)
Notes: NUV = non use value, see Annex 3. NTFP = non-timber forest products.
Direct use value = revenues from timber, agriculture or oil palm. No study was
conducted for the estimate of NUV and it should therefore be regarded as a guess
only.  Note that each entry refers to the difference in net present value returns from
SFM relative to the returns from subsistence agriculture. Thus, area A is worse
than subsistence agriculture by UK£ 884 per ha for direct use, but £971 better for
carbon.
The major issue to note is that SFM is not economically profitably if ‘direct use
values’ only are calculated, i.e. if consideration is given only to the marketed
produce from the land. This holds even when non-timber products are included.
The exception is area 5 where Prunus africana is grown in the forest option.
Generally, then, non-marketed values are very important. Moreover, within the
non-market values, carbon dominates, a result consistent with the review carried
out by Pearce (1998).
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8.4.9 Smith et al., Study for Peru
Smith et al., (1999a) (see also Mourato, 1999) conduct a contingent valuation
study of slash-and-burn farmers in the Ucayali region of the Peruvian Amazon.
They sought the farmers’ willingness to accept compensation simultaneously to
conserve part of the forest outright and to switch to multistrata agroforestry for the
rest of the forest.  Farmers were first asked their willingness to accept (WTA)
compensation (from electric utilities engaged in carbon offset projects) for the
combined preservation/agroforestry package, and were then asked by how much
they would discount the stated WTA to secure access to the environmental
services of the conserved part of the land. The difference between the two WTA
measures, gives a willingness to pay measure (i.e. in terms of forgone compen-
sation) for the environmental services. The results were, in average terms:
• $218 compensation required for forgoing one hectare of forest that would be
converted to outright preservation;
• $138 compensation for forgoing one hectare of forest that would be converted
to agroforestry;
• $67 willingness to pay for environmental services for forest preservation
• $41 willingness to pay for environmental services for agroforestry.
The difference between the two WTP estimates reveals that farmers are aware of
the difference in the value of environmental services from agroforestry compared
to preservation.
The study is significant in that it elicits (a) the compensation farmers would need
to fill the ‘gap’ between the returns to agroforestry and the returns to slash and
burn agriculture, and (b) the willingness to pay of farmers for forest services of
which they are well aware. The gap between agroforestry and slash-and-burn
returns is a perceived one and is highly influenced by farmers’ discount rates, i.e.
returns are higher to agroforestry over a long period but lower if the time horizon
is limited to a few years.  Interestingly, stated WTA to switch to agroforestry
compared very well with the difference in the annual stream of returns when
viewed from this short-term perspective, i.e. farmers were well aware of the
returns from different systems.
The relevance of the study lies mainly in the information provided about farmers’
perceptions about the forest, but, in so far as agroforestry can be thought of as a
form of SFM,  it suggests that the social returns to SFM are higher than slash-and-
burn provided the ‘rest of the world’ is willing to pay for carbon services from the
forest.
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9. An Economic Model of Sustainable Forestry
One way of encapsulating the previous discussion is to place it in the context of an
economic model of forested land use. Annex 3 outlines a model developed by
Hyde (1999) and to which we have added explicit consideration of non-market
values. The essence of the analysis is to show the relevance of sustainable forestry
in various stages of economic development. Sustainable forestry can only exist if
returns to it exceed those of alternative uses of the land and exceed the costs of
management, including the costs of preventing entry by colonists. Hyde suggests
that these conditions will tend not to prevail in the earlier stages of development
so that, generally, the poorer the nation the less likely it is for sustainable forestry
to emerge as a viable land use option. But the analysis also suggests that if non-
market values are high, there could be substantial returns from managing forests
on a sustainable basis. The additional condition, of course, is that the returns must
be capable of ‘capture’ by the forest owner, whether it is a private individual or
the state.
The analysis of Section 8 and Annex 2 suggests that most non-market values will
not be high enough to change the underlying and somewhat pessimistic
conclusion of Hyde’s approach, i.e. sustainable forestry is  potentially viable but
risky in areas where development is still at the early stages. The fairly clear
exception, however, is carbon, and the few case studies that are relevant seem to
confirm that carbon values from carbon trading could produce the situation in
Figure A3.4 in Annex 3 where a significant sustainable forest sector emerges
based on non-market values. Additionally promising is forest certification,
depending on the extent to which stated WYP is confirmed by actual WTP.
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10. Conclusions
In this paper we have reviewed the available literature in an attempt to cast some
light on the issue of the type of forest management regime that is best suited to the
overall aim of slowing the rate of loss of the world’s forests and biodiversity. The
traditional argument that ‘sustainable forestry’ is the most preferred option has
recently come under criticism from those who argue that it is neither profitable nor
necessarily environmentally preferable to conventional logging.
Finding general conclusions is complex, not least because the terminology in the
literature is confusing and often value-laden, even down to regarding ‘logging’ as
an undesirable activity per se (Section 3). While not entirely satisfactory, we adopt
the language of ‘conventional logging’, ‘sustainable timber management’,
‘sustainable forest management’ and ‘protection’ (Section 5). The essential
differences are that sustainable systems have regard to longer term outcomes than
do conventional systems, and that sustainable systems are likely to involve far
more regulatory supervision than conventional systems.
The model adopted proceeds from a comparison of financial rates of return to
differing forest management systems, through to economic rates of return, and
from there to wider rate of return concepts that include non-market values, e.g.
biodiversity conservation and carbon storage. There are then at least three
stakeholder perspectives on these rates of return: those of the logger, those of the
nation, and those of the world as a whole. In reality, there are many different
divisions of interest, from those of illicit forest users, indigenous peoples, enforced
migrants and so on. The rough benchmark is that forested land should be used for
the highest social value use, i.e. the use that maximises the broad concept of rate
of return indicated above.  This notion requires that any values not embodied in
the market place be ‘captured’ through various incentive mechanisms. Those
mechanisms - such as debt-for-nature swaps, carbon offsets, green image
investments etc., - are not discussed here. The idea of maximising a rate of return
also does not embrace the crucially vital question of the distribution of gains and
losses. While important, these concerns lie outside the scope of this paper.
The evidence on financial rates of return is surveyed in Section 7.1. While
sustainable systems appear capable of earning returns in excess of some ‘modest’
discount rate (5%, and in some cases 10%), they do not compete financially with
other systems. Given the nature of the management process for sustainability, this
is not unexpected and conforms with the critics’ view of sustainable management.
Are there any factors that mitigate this inequality?  Section 7.2 looks at the various
arguments that have arisen, from improving concessionaire property rights, to the
future of timber prices, and the valorisation of non-commercial species. None
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appears to give sustainable timber management any edge over conventional
systems. All have some role to play, but it is not significant. The evidence on
discount rates tends to reinforce the critics’ arguments. Recent studies suggest that
discount rates in poor countries are very high, indeed, so high that few
investments of any kind, let alone in forestry, would seem to be economically
justified. But if the focus is on sustainable and unsustainable forest systems, then
high discount rates simply reinforce the initial preference for conventional
systems based on rapid liquidation of the timber and other resources without
regard for future harvests or other impacts.
Some of the critics have argued that logging should be permitted so as to get an
initial period of damage over and done with, leaving the way open for protection.
The argument rests on some real possibilities that future logging threats are
minimised, and land is cheaper once the loggers have gone. Doubts about this
argument are raised in Section 8.2: logging once may simply lead to subsequent
visits from the same or other loggers; the way is opened up for colonists; and
damage may be so extensive that protection ceases to have much of a conservation
justification. Sustainable systems are also open to threat since they too open up
forests to colonists. The extent to which they will avoid being converted by
colonists rests heavily on their financial viability, which, as we have seen, may not
be very strong.
The focus therefore shifts to non-market values. Are these higher under
sustainable management than conventional logging? Our review in Section 8.4
suggests that they are. It is true that sustainable forestry loses some environmental
benefits relative to the pre-intervention period.. But there is no necessary link
between sustainable forestry and environmental damage. Part of the problem
arises from extrapolating from limited experience, e.g. with mahogany, to tropical
forestry in general. This said, research on ‘biodiversity impact profiles’ is not
strong enough yet to reach firm conclusions (Section 8.4.1). For carbon storage,
the picture seems fairly clearly in favour of sustainable systems.
The final stage of the analysis asks if these non-timber values are sufficiently
important that they outweigh the financial deficit of sustainable forestry when
compared to conventional logging. While there is only a limited number of studies
to guide us in this respect, those that exist seem fairly uniform in finding that the
non-market benefits of sustainable systems are significant. All tend to acknow-
ledge that timber yields are less on a comparative basis but that non-timber values
more than offset the relatively lower yield. The role of carbon is highlighted
because a survey of non-market values suggests that carbon values dominate the
non-market values overall, a conclusion echoed in the case studies reviewed here.
Other indirect evidence is also marshalled, e.g. there appears to be a marked
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willingness to pay by consumers for natural regeneration of forests and for
sustainable managed systems.
Finally, Section 9 and Annex 3 place the analysis in the context of a forest model
developed by Hyde and extended here. This suggests that the prospects for
sustainable forest management is low in the early stages of development, and
increases as the values attached to the forest and its services rises over time.
Extended to include carbon and biodiversity values, it is arguable that the potential
for sustainable forestry is far greater, even in the early stages of development, than
might be thought.
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 Annex 1: Discounting
Let the profit from SFM be $Ys every year. Then the present value of this profit
is:
PVs = ΣYs/(1+r)t = Ys(1+r)/r
Let the profit from CL be characterized as an initial profit in the first year of Yu
which ‘decays’ over time at rate d. Then
PVu = ΣYu(1-d)t/(1+r)t = Yu(1+r)/(r+d)
We can find the rate of discount at which these two profit streams are equal, i.e.
the rate of discount at which the land user should be indifferent between SFM and
CL. This is given by
PVs = Pvu, or
Ys(1+r)/r = Yu (1+r)/(r+d)
Such that r = d.Ys/(Yu-Ys)
Suppose d = 20%, i.e. in roughly 5 years the logger leaves the area. Let Ys =
0.5Yu, i.e. SFM secures yields in the first year of just one half of those from CL.
Then, r = 20%. If r>20%, CL is preferred to SFM, and if r < 20% SFM is
preferred to CL.
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Annex 2: Non-timber economic values12
In their survey of non-timber benefits, Lampietti and Dixon (1995) divide non-
timber values into extractive, non-extractive and preservation values. Extractive
values involve an actual harvest, e.g. of nuts or rattan. Non-extractive values
should be more correctly titled non-extractive use values since they involve use
but not harvest of the forest. They include recreation and tourism, but also the
indirect ecological functions of forests such as watershed protection and carbon
storage. Preservation values are what most now call non-use or passive use values.
Extractive Values
Taking extractive values first, Lampietti and Dixon note that most of the studies
relate to Central and South America (14 studies out of 20 analysed). Average per
hectare values come to $86-101 per annum for Central and South America and
$60-65 for Asian countries. The Central and South American results are
exaggerated by the Peters et al., (1989) study which has been severely criticised
(Godoy et al., 1993; Southgate, 1996). Godoy et al., (1993) report 23 different
estimates from studies which only partially overlap with those reported in
Lampietti and Dixon (1995). The authors resist the temptation to average the
results since they are more concerned to identify differences in methodology and
errors as factors accounting for the variation in values. Ignoring the caveats, an
average of $50 per hectare per year is obtained (Pearce and Moran, 1994). Some
more recent studies suggest higher extractive values. Thus, Adger et al., (1995)
report values from just 2 US cents per hectare up to $1537 for te'lom grove
(groves in rainforests) management and coffee growing, and around $6 ha  pa for
pharmaceuticals in Mexico. Bojö (1993) reports extractive values in private
woodlands in Zimbabwe of US$39 per hectare. An extensive study by Kramer et
al., (1995) of the Mantadia National Park in Madagascar found that villagers
would lose around $91 per household per year from forgone forest products (rice,
fuelwood, crayfish, crab, tenreck and frogs). This converts to just $3.2 per
hectare13. In contrast, Houghton and Mendelsohn (1996) find present values of
fodder, fuelwood and timber (mainly the first two) of $2200-3600 per hectare for
the Nepalese Middle Hills, or around $176 - 288 per hectare in annuity form (at a
5% discount rate).
                                                
12 It is important to understand that identifying non-timber values is only part of the overall
analysis required to establish whether or not such values will contribute to sustainable forest use.
Market conditions, macroeconomic policy, property rights etc. all matter. See Pérez and Byron
(1999).
    13 $91 x 351 households = $31,941 across an area of 9,875 hectares = $3.2 per hectare.
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With regard to pharmaceutical products, the subject of extensive debate, Pearce
and Puroshothaman (1995) suggest values of $0.01 to $21 per ha per year, based
on established probabilities of finding a successful drug from plant species
currently at risk. This assumes a tropical forest area of 1 billion hectares.
Ruitenbeek (1989) has rough estimates of medicinal plant value in the Korup
forest, Cameroun, which translate to around $0.2 to $0.7 per hectare. Using a very
different approach, Simpson et al., (1994) suggest that, taking an optimistic point
of view, a pharmaceutical company's willingness to pay would be a maximum of
$20 per hectare in Western Ecuador and very much less, perhaps $1 per hectare,
elsewhere. Thus, adopting different approaches, these studies produce very low
values for pharmaceutical values. Mendelsohn and Balick (1995) suggest a value
of undiscovered tropical forest drugs to the pharmaceutical companies of $2.8-4.1
billion. They divide this by 3.1 billion hectares of tropical forest to obtain average
values of $0.9 to $1.3 per hectare. The 3.1 billion hectares figures appears to be an
exaggeration, whereas the Pearce-Puroshothaman (1995) estimate appears too
low. Using a figure of 1.7 billion hectares of total tropical forest, the Pearce-
Puroshothaman figures would reduce further to a range of nearly zero to $12.3 per
hectare, and the Mendelsohn-Balick figures would rise to $1.6 to $2.4 per
hectare14. The high values of Pearce-Puroshothaman reflect values to society
rather than values to drug companies, i.e. values based on lives saved and the
value of a statistical life15. The comparable Mendelsohn Balick figure for social
values would be around 50 times the private willingness to pay figure. It seems
clear that pharmaceutical values will not 'save' tropical forests unless the social
value of genetic material is translated into private willingness to pay.
Overall, the conclusions on extractivism appear to be that, in some circumstances,
there are high values to be obtained and these may help the case for conservation
or sustainable management16. Average values have little general meaning but,
such as they are, the estimates suggest that $50 per hectare may be a very rough
rule of thumb, but there are clearly situations in which higher values can be
achieved and others where $50 will seriously exaggerate the net revenues. As a
                                                
    14 In contrast, Balick and Mendelsohn (1992) suggest annual net revenues of $19-61 per
hectare for Belize.
15  A ‘statistical life’ refers to the value that would be assigned to a single (anonymous) life if
each individual’s WTP for a given risk reduction is aggregated over a given population.
Thus, if each individual has a WTP of $5 to secure a risk reduction of 0.001, the
aggregate value of risk is 5/0.001 = $5000 .
    16 We abstract from an alternative argument which would express NTVs as a percentage
of household income. Kant et al., (1996) show that household incomes in West Bengal
are increased by 20-30% because of income from non-timber products, and that the
effect is biggest for the poorest households.
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general rule, however, limited faith can be put in non-timber extractive values to
save tropical forests. This contrasts with some of the grander claims made in the
past (Myers, 1984; Peters et al., 1989). Southgate (1996) warns against the
exaggerated view that South American extractivists can live by non-timber
products alone - they will invariably deforest as well - and against the assumption
that extractivism is inevitably sustainable. Extractivists tend to be poor. Net
returns to vegetable ivory collection in Ecuador and rubber tapping in the Amazon
basin, for example, tend to be only just above the opportunity cost of labour.
Non-Extractive Values
Non-extractive values tend to comprise recreation and indirect ecological
functions such as watershed protection and carbon storage. Of these, recreation
and carbon storage have attracted the most study.
Adger et al., (1995) suggest ecotourism values for Mexican forests of some $8 ha
pa, whilst Tobias and Mendelsohn (1991) use the travel cost method to obtain
values of $52 per hectare for Monteverde in Costa Rica. One would expect high
values for rare ecosystems such as the montane cloud forest of Monteverde.
Kumari (1995) estimated a potential recreational value of M$57 ha for her study
site in Malaysia, but in present value terms and at 8% discount rate. The cash
flows suggest an annual income of about $5 per hectare. For 'conventional'
tropical forest, then, values of $5-10 ha might seem appropriate but it has to be
stressed that such values are location-specific. Vast tracts of forest will attract no
tourist value at all.
Lampietti and Dixon (1995) find a limited number of studies dealing with erosion
prevention and which are capable of estimation of benefits on a per hectare basis.
Magrath and Arens' (1989) study of soil erosion in Java suggests minimum
estimates of damage of $2-7 per hectare. Cruz et al's (1988) study of Philippines
suggests $17-28 per ha; Ruitenbeek's (1992) Korup study implies $14 per ha for
fisheries protection and $2 per ha for flood control. To these estimates we can add
Kumari's (1995) detailed analysis for Malaysia. This suggests hydrological
benefits in terms of conserved agricultural output equal to $25 ha pa. Domestic
water benefits and fisheries protection would add a further $2-3 in each case.
Overall, then, watershed protection functions do seem to have values which
cluster around $30 ha pa once a reasonably wide range of functions is
considered17.
                                                
    17 In contrast, however, Adger et al's study for Mexico  suggests just 4 cents per hectare
for watershed protection.
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Unquestionably the largest value dominating the use values of tropical forests is
that relating to carbon sequestration. Lampietti and Dixon's values for this
function are too low due to the adoption of somewhat outdated estimates of the
marginal damage from carbon dioxide releases. All forests store carbon so that, if
cleared for agriculture there will be a release of carbon dioxide which will
contribute to the accelerated greenhouse effect and hence global warming. In
order to derive a value for the 'carbon credit' that should be ascribed to a tropical
forest, we need to know (a) the net carbon released when forests are converted to
other uses, and (b) the economic value of one tonne of carbon released to the
atmosphere.
Carbon will be released at different rates according to the method of clearance and
subsequent land use.  With burning there will be an immediate release of CO2 into
the atmosphere, and some of the remaining carbon will be locked in ash and
charcoal which is resistant to decay.  The slash not converted by fire into CO2 or
charcoal and ash decays over time, releasing most of its carbon to the atmosphere
within 10-20 years. Studies of tropical forests indicate that significant amounts of
cleared vegetation become lumber, slash, charcoal and ash; the proportion differs
for closed and open forests;  the smaller stature and drier climate of open forests
result in the combustion of higher proportion of the vegetation.
If tropical forested land is  converted to pasture or permanent agriculture, then the
amount of carbon stored in secondary vegetation is equivalent to the carbon
content of the biomass of crops planted, or the grass grown on the pasture.  If a
secondary forest is allowed to grow, then carbon will accumulate, and maximum
biomass density is attained after a relatively short time.
Table A.2.1 illustrates the net carbon storage effects of land use conversion from
tropical forests; closed primary, closed secondary, or open forests; to shifting
cultivation, permanent agriculture, or pasture. The negative figures represent
emissions of carbon; for example, conversion from closed primary forest to
shifting agriculture results in a net loss of 194 tC/ha. The greatest loss of carbon
involves change of land use from primary closed forest to permanent agriculture.
These figures represent the once and for all change that will occur in carbon
storage as a result of the various land use conversions.
The data suggest that, allowing for the carbon fixed by subsequent land uses,
carbon released from deforestation of secondary and primary tropical forest is of
the order of 100-200 tonnes of carbon per hectare.
The carbon released from burning tropical forests contributes to global warming,
and we now have several estimates of the minimum economic damage done by
global warming, leaving aside catastrophic events. Recent work suggests a
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'central' value of $20 of damage for every tonne of carbon released (Fankhauser
and Pearce, 1994). More recent work still suggests that this value may be higher at
$30 to $40 tC in current price terms (Eyre et al., 1997). Being conservative, and
applying the $20 tC figure to the data in Table A.2.1, we can conclude that
converting an open forest to agriculture or pasture would result in global warming
damage of, say, $600-1000 per hectare; conversion of closed secondary forest
would cause damage of $2000-3000 per hectare; and conversion of primary forest
to agriculture would give rise to damage of about $4000 - 4400 per hectare. Note
that these estimates allow for carbon fixation in the subsequent land use.
Table A.2.1 Changes in carbon stored with forest land use conversion
(t/C/ha)
Original C Shifting
Agriculture
Permanent
Agriculture
Pasture
Original C
Closed primary 283 -204 -220 -220
Closed secondary 194 -106 -152 -122
Open forest 115 -36 -52 -52
Source: Brown and Pearce (1994)
Note: Shifting agriculture represents carbon in biomass and soils in second year of
shifting cultivation cycle.
There are problems with these values of the indirect carbon storage functions of
tropical forests. First, the estimates of carbon release are uncertain, while the
estimates of the economic value of carbon are even more uncertain. The $20 per
tonne carbon value is the product of a Monte Carlo simulation so that it
encompasses a good deal of the uncertainty about impacts and values, but it does
not deal with the potential for surprises or extreme events (Fankhauser, 1995).
Second, even if the values are broadly correct and global warming is a 'real'
phenomenon, the avoidance of deforestation or investment in avoided logging or
forest damage may not be cheapest ways of reducing carbon emissions. The
opportunity cost of conservation is clearly the 'development' benefit forgone, i.e.
the returns to forest clearance for agriculture, timber or livestock. It seems very
likely that these forgone values are indeed very low in many cases. For example,
Schneider (1992) reports upper bound values of $300 per hectare for land in
Rondonia, Brazil. The figures suggest carbon credit values 2-15 times the price of
land in Rondonia. These 'carbon credits' also compare favourably with the value
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of forest land for timber as implied by the returns in Table 1. If land is worth $300
per hectare in a development use, then the cost of conservation on global warming
grounds becomes, say, $3 per tonne carbon ($300 divided by 100 t/ha, say). If the
land is worth $2000, then carbon conservation costs $20 per tC. The latter cost is
certainly not the cheapest way of conserving carbon, but $3 per tonne could be
very attractive. Existing carbon trades under joint implementation initiatives range
widely but ‘rule of thumb’ prices centre on $5-10 TCP (Pearce et al., 1999).
Non-use Values
The final category of value in the Lampietti-Dixon survey is preservation value,
by which is meant passive or non-use value. The only estimate of such value for
tropical forests is that of Kramer et al. (1994). This reports average WTP of US
citizens for protection of an additional 5% of the world's tropical forests. One time
payments amounted to $29-51 per US household, or $2.6-4.6 billion. If this WTP
was extended to all OECD households, and ignoring income differences, a broad
order of magnitude would be a one-off payment of $11 - 23 billion. Annuitised,
this would be, say, $1.1 to 2.3 billion p.a. Taking 1.7 billion hectares as the area
for total tropical forest, 5% of it would come to 85 million hectares, so that annual
willingness to pay would be $13 to $27 ha. Obviously, the assumptions being
made here are fairly heroic, but they bear comparison with some of the use values
identified above, and also pale into insignificance when compared to the carbon
storage values.
Pearce (1996) looks at other potential estimates of global value. One approach is
to see what the values for 'similar assets' would imply. Willingness to pay studies
for the conservation of biological resources suggest average payments of perhaps
$10 p.a. per person. This would produce a fund of $4 billion p.a. when applied to
OECD households. This would translate to around $2.3 per hectare if applied to
all tropical forest. An alternative is to look at implicit prices in debt-for-nature
swaps. How far the procedure of estimating implicit prices of this kind is open to
doubt, although it has been used by some writers - see Ruitenbeek (1992) and
Pearce and Moran (1994). The range of implicit values is from around 1 cent/ha to
just over 4 dollars/ha (Pearce, 1996).
The estimates of non-use value are clearly very speculative and it is not even clear
that the methodologies in question are eliciting non-use rather than some mixture
of use and non-use values. As we have seen, the only direct approach based on
contingent valuation suggests fairly significant values of $13-27 ha for a small
part of the total forest stock. The more indirect approaches suggest very much
lower values of perhaps one tenth of the direct values.
62
Annex 3 The economics of forest land use: the Hyde model
This annex outlines an analytical framework developed by Hyde et al (1996) and
Hyde (1999), but includes a more explicit treatment of non-market values.
A distinction is made between three contexts: in the first the forest within the
agricultural frontier is cleared and the residual, i.e. remaining  forest, is not
colonised. In the second case, forest values rise as people demand timber wood
and fuelwood but no ‘forest sector’ emerges. In the third case forest values rise
again, creating the conditions for a sustainable forest sector. These three contexts
are depicted in Figures A3.1-A3.3. Other forest values – fruits, nuts, latex etc.-
could be described in the same manner.
In each case, monetary values are measured on the vertical axis and distance from
the initial site of origin is measured on the horizontal axis. NAV is the net
agricultural value of the land; NFV is the net forest value of the land; MC is the
marginal cost of securing rights to the land.
In Figure A3.1 NAV lies wholly outside the NFV curve so that crops are grown
on ‘secure’ land up to the point D1 where MC just equals NAV. Pasture or
grazing (and perhaps crops) take place on the area D1D2, but access is open and
not subject to private rights. The residual standing forest exists from D2 to Dz.
NFV lies wholly inside NAV so that the standing forest is degraded up to D2.
In Figure A3.2 NFV shifts outwards since there is a demand for wood (timber,
fuelwood etc) and the new NFV curve cuts the NAV curve below the intersection
of NAV with MC. Secure agriculture occurs up to D1, open access agriculture
from D1 to D2 and the distance D2-D3 is degraded forest. It is degraded because
the marginal cost of protection lies above the NFV curve. Note that in neither of
the first two cases does a managed forest sector emerge.
In Figure A3.3 NFV shifts further to the right with the intersection of NFV and
NAV lying above the intersection of NAV and MC. Up to D1 there is secure
agriculture. Between D1 and D2 now there is a sustainable forest sector since
forestry is the highest use value of that land and the MC of protection lies below
the NFV curve. From D2 to D4 forest values dominate other uses, but the MC of
protection is above the NFV curve. Hence D2D4 is degraded open access forest
land, some of which may be used for agriculture.
The essence of the analysis is that it matters at what stage one is for policy
purposes. In stages 1 and 2, a sustainable forest sector is not likely to develop. In
stage 3 it is. As the NFV curve shifts outward, so the residual ‘natural’ forest is
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increasingly invaded, i.e. deforestation occurs. In cases 1 and 2 certain familiar
forest policies will not work, e.g. giving away seedlings or some other form of
subsidy. Measures to lower the marginal cost of protection can result in
sustainable forestry (moving from case 2 to case 3) and might be typified by
policies design to ensure community control of forests.
We can now introduce non-market values. The NFV curve in A2.1-3 are
‘exploitative’ curves, i.e. they involve forest uses that destroy the forest, with the
exception of the sustainable forest section of NFV in Figure A3.3. Some non-
market values can be realised only if the forest is protected and not used in an
exploitative way. Carbon storage (as opposed to sequestration by growing trees)
would be the obvious example and biodiversity might be another. Suppose that
these values are large relative to other values, including timber values, as is
suggested by Pearce (1998). For convenience suppose that they are also constant
across all forest, which would be the case for carbon but is unlikely for bio-
diversity. Then the NMFV curve in Figure A3.4 shows this value curve lying
above other curves apart from a section of NAV. This suggests that secure
agriculture would be practiced up to D1, whilst D1D2 would be sustainable
forestry inclusive of carbon and biodiversity, and D2 onwards would be residual
unprotected forest. The effect of the non-market values is therefore to greatly
expand the sustainable forest sector, assuming, of course, that the non-market
values are realised by, for example, international transfers such as carbon trades,
GEF involvement, heritage financing etc.
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